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Abstract
We propose a new interpretation of objective deterministic chances in
statistical physics based on physical computational complexity. This
notion applies to a single physical system (be it an experimental set–
up in the lab, or a subsystem of the universe), and quantifies (1) the
difficulty to realize a physical state given another, (2) the ‘distance’ (in
terms of physical resources) of a physical state from another, and (3)
the size of the set of time–complexity functions that are compatible
with the physical resources required to reach a physical state from
another. This view (a) exorcises “ignorance” from statistical physics,
and (b) underlies a new interpretation to non–relativistic quantum
mechanics.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic statements in a deterministic dynamical setting are commonly
understood as epistemic (Lewis ,1986). Since in such a setting a complete
specification of the state of the system at one time – together with the dy-
namics – uniquely determine the state at later times, the inability to pre-
dict an outcome exactly (with probability 1) is predicated on the notion of
ignorance, or incomplete knowledge. Such a subjective interpretation is
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natural in the context of classical statistical mechanics (SM), where a phys-
ical state is represented as a point on phase space, and the dynamics is
a trajectory in that space, or in the context of Bohmian mechanics, where
the phase space is replaced with a configuration space and the ontology is
augmented with the quantum potential, but recently it has been suggested
as a viable option also in the context of orthodox non–relativistic quantum
mechanics (QM), where the state is represented as a vector in the Hilbert
space, and the dynamics is a unitary transformation, i.e., a rotation, in that
space (Caves, Fuchs, & Schack, 2002). In all three cases the dynamics is
strictly deterministic, and the only difference – apart from the representa-
tion of the state – is in the character of the probabilities: in classical SM
or Bohmian mechanics they are subsets of phase space (or configuration
space) obeying a Boolean structure; in QM they are angles between sub-
spaces in the Hilbert space obeying a non–Boolean structure, whence the
famous non–locality, contextuality, and the violation of Bell’s inequalities.
Such an epistemic notion of probability in statistical physics appears to
many inappropriate. The problem is not how lack of knowledge can bring
about physical phenomena (Albert, 2000, p. 64); it can’t. Neither is it a
problem about ontological vagueness (Hagar, 2003). Rather, the problem
is that an epistemic interpretation of probability in statistical physics, be it
classical SM or QM, turns these theories into a type of statistical inference:
while applied to physical systems, these theories become theories about
epistemic judgments in the light of incomplete knowledge, and the prob-
abilities therein do not represent or influence the physical situation, but
only represent our state of mind (Frigg, 2007; Uffink, 2011).
In recent years an alternative, objective view of probability, has been
defended, both in the foundations of classical SM and in the context of
Bohmian mechanics in the foundations of QM, based on the notion of typ-
icality (Maudlin, 2007). Typicality claims tell us what most physical states
are, or which dynamical evolution are overwhelmingly more likely, by as-
signing measure 1 to the set of such states or the set of such dynamical
evolutions.1 Such claims make an analytical connection between a de-
terministic dynamics and a characterization of certain empirical distribu-
tions, hence can be interpreted as objective, having nothing to do with
one’s credence or state of knowledge. With this notion, or so the story
1Examples are “most quantum states are mixed, i.e., entangled with their environ-
ment”, or “most systems relax to thermodynamic equilibrium if left to themselves”.
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goes, one can treat probabilistic statements in a deterministic physical set-
ting as arising from an objective state of affairs, and the theories that give
rise to these statements as theories about the physical world, rather than
theories about our state of knowledge.
This objective view of probability, however, is not problem–free. First,
as its proponents admit (Goldstein et al. 2010), the notion of typicality
is too weak: a theorem saying that a condition is true of the vast major-
ity of systems does not prove anything about a concrete given system.
Next, the notion lacks logical closure: a pair of typical states is not neces-
sarily a typical pair of states, which means that “being typical” is not an
intrinsic property of an initial condition, not even for a single system, but
depends on the relation between the state and other possible initial condi-
tions (Pitowsky, 2011). Possible ways around these difficulties have been
suggested,2 but while these problems may be circumvented, there exists
a deeper lacuna underlying the notion of typicality which threatens the
entire project.
The point is that typicality claims depend on a specific choice of mea-
sure, usually the Lebesgue measure or any other measure absolutely con-
tinuous with it. But what justifies this choice of measure when an infinite
number of possible measures are equally plausible (Hemmo & Shenker,
2011a)? Moreover, even if we have established somehow that, relative to
a preferred choice of measure, a certain set of states T is typical, i.e., its
members are overwhelmingly more probable with respect to all possible
states, what justifies the claim that we are likely to observe, or “pick–up”,
members of that set T more often than members of the complement set
T˜ ? After all, the measure we have imposed on the space of all possible
potential states (T ∪ T˜ ) need not dictate the measure we impose on the
space of our actual observations. Indeed, while under the choice of the
Haar measure “most” quantum states are mixed, hence entangled with
their environment, we can still realize (hence observe) pure states in the
lab, at least to a certain extent. In what sense, then, are these states “rare”?
The twofold problem of justification of the measure is, on final account,
a manifestation of the problem of induction (Pitowsky, 1985, pp. 234–238).
On a strictly empiricist view, the effort to justify typicality claims is just an-
2Maudlin (2007, p. 287), for example, rejects the requirement to assign probabilities to
single systems, and Pitowsky (2011) proposes to retain most of the advantages of typical-
ity but to retreat to a full–fledged Lebesgue measure, with its combinatorial interpreta-
tion.
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other (futile) attempt to give demonstrations to matters of fact, or to derive
contingent conclusions from necessary truths. The point here is that there
is no surrogate for experience in the empirical sciences, and that inductive
reasoning is the best one can do in one’s attempts to understand the world.
We tend to agree with the above criticism, but we also believe the alterna-
tive (or rather the lack thereof) it leaves us with is equally unsatisfactory.
While typicality arguments do seem to achieve too much, the above pes-
simism seems to leave us with too little: not only are we unable to make
sense of objective deterministic chances on this empiricist account, we are
also unable to justify the standard statistical methods in the scientific prac-
tice. These methods are commonly understood within the context of the
frequentist approach to probability, and yet the latter approach is based
on typicality arguments (these appear, e.g., implicitly in the weak law of
large numbers, or explicitly in the definition of a random sequence), and
so the criticism raised against typicality equally undercuts the attempts to
apply frequentist methods in the empirical sciences (Hemmo & Shenker,
2011b).
Since we believe there is more to statistical physics than statistical in-
ference, we here propose a new non–frequentist interpretation of physical
probability as an alternative to typicality. Our notion is objective, dynam-
ical, applies to individual states or systems, and its definition requires no
convergence theorems. Die hard empiricist as we are, we offer little re-
lief from the problem of justification of the measure imposed on the space
of all possible states. We do address directly, however, the problem of
justification of the measure imposed on the space of all actual states: on
our view, objective physical probabilities are transition probabilities that
supervene on the time–complexity of the actual dynamical evolution. Our
proposal is thus consistent with the above criticism marshaled against typ-
icality and frequentism, and can serve as a viable alternative to the current
epistemic view of probability in statistical physics, turning the latter once
again into a physical theory about the natural world.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we spell out the ba-
sic assumptions behind our proposal. Warming up, in section 3 we show
how by equating “probable” with “easy” (in terms of computational com-
plexity), one can assign measure 1 (0) to a set of states whose realiza-
tion requires a dynamical evolution with polynomial (exponential) time–
complexity. In section 4 we move to a full–fledged definition of objective
probability that quantifies how hard it is to realize a physical state, and
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measures (in terms of physical resources) the ‘distance’ between any such
pair of states. In section 5 we apply our new interpretation to classical,
statistical, and quantum mechanics. In doing so we introduce a new inter-
pretation to the probabilities of QM. Section 6 concludes.
2 Assumptions
We start by spelling out the five basic assumptions that underlie our mod-
els. They are Determinism, P ⊂ EXPTIME, Boundedness, Discreteness, and Lo-
cality. These assumptions are working hypotheses in the framework from
which our interpretation of probability stems, namely, physical computa-
tional complexity. In this framework (Geroch & Hartle, 1986; Pitowsky,
1990; Pitowsky, 1996), the performance of physical systems is analyzed
with notions and concepts that originate in computational complexity the-
ory, by approximating dynamical evolutions with a discrete set of compu-
tational steps to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. These assumptions help
us delineate the two probability spaces in our models: the space of phys-
ically allowable states, and the space of physically allowable dynamical
evolutions.
A. Determinism
Our models rest on the assumption of strict determinism. This assump-
tion follows from the strong physical Church–Turing thesis (PCTT hence-
forth),3 according to which actual dynamical evolutions of physical sys-
tems in our world can be regarded as computations carried by determinis-
tic Turing machines. Agreed, some physical theories do allow in principle
for non–Turing–computable phase trajectories (trajectories that cannot be
represented by recursive functions), and, in addition, there exists a vast lit-
erature on the physical possibility of supertasks and “hypercomputation”,
that aims to show that Turing–computability is not a natural property, and
need not apply a priori in the physical world. Nevertheless, if the strong
PCTT holds, then as a contingent matter of fact, non–Turing–computable tra-
jectories are ruled out, and the above, rather contrived, counterexamples
3The physical Church–Turing thesis is logically independent of the original Church–
Turing thesis. See e.g., (Pitowsky & Shagrir, 2003).
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are not realizable in the actual universe.4 In what follows we thus disre-
gard naked singularities, closed timelike curves, non–globally hyperbolic
spacetime models, ill–posed problems, divergences, and the like, adher-
ing to the idea that every dynamical evolution takes a physical state to
one and only one physical state.5
B. P ⊂ EXPTIME
The fact that each computation requires physical resources (energy and
time) that increase with the size (the number of degrees of freedom) of
the system allows us to classify different dynamical evolutions as either
“easy” (i.e., having polynomial time–complexity such as O(nc)) or “hard”
(i.e., having exponential time–complexity such asO(cn)).6 That there exists
a meaningful difference between these two classes (and between different
degrees of time–complexity within each class) is the consequence of the
Time Hierarchy Theorem (Hartmanis & Stearns, 1965).
C. Boundedness
Assumption (A) allows us to apply the machinery of complexity theory
to dynamical evolutions, by treating them as computations. Assumption
(B) allows us to classify states (and the dynamical evolutions that realize
them) as “easy” or “hard”. Assumption (C) allows us to impose upper and
lower bounds on the set of all possible dynamical evolutions in the actual
universe, based on the following two facts:
• The physical resources (energy and number of particles) in the uni-
verse are bounded from above; beyond a certain degree of an expo-
nential or a polynomial time evolution, the next computational step
would require resources that would supersede this bound.
4So far there are two such counterexamples: Pour el & Richards’ (1989) wave equation
in 3 dimensions and Pitowsky’s (1990) spacetime model that allows finite–time execution
of an infinite number of computational steps. See also (Hogarth, 1994) for an elaboration
on the latter, and (Earman & Norton, 1993) for further discussion.
5Note that from a strictly dynamical perspective, quantum dynamics is fully determin-
istic: Schro¨dinger’s equations takes any quantum state to one and only one quantum
state.
6Here n is the input size – in our case the dimension of the system at hand, and c is a
(rational, as we shall assume below) coefficient.
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• The minimum number of computational steps is 1, and so for a given
n (the size of the system) there always exists a lower bound on the set
of possible dynamical evolutions below which the number of steps
required for this input size n is smaller than 1.
D. Discreteness
Assumption (D) allows us to discretize the set of the physically allowable
dynamical evolutions. Two facts warrant the elimination of real coeffi-
cients in our classification of dynamical evolutions into time–complexity
classes. First, each dynamical evolution is governed by a Hamiltonian (the
total energy function). Second, the time–energy uncertainty relation limits
the ability to resolve arbitrary energy differences between any two Hamil-
tonians (Childs, Preskill & Renes, 2000; Aharonov, Massar, & Popescu,
2002). This means that we cannot distinguish between two unknown Hamil-
tonians with infinite precision, hence the space of possible Hamiltonians
is discrete.
E. Locality
Finally, and consistent with the current state of affairs in physics, in physi-
cally realizing the Hamiltonians that govern the dynamical evolutions, we
allow only local interactions.
Models
The above assumptions allow us to propose two possible models for ob-
jective physical probability. We do not claim that these models are unique,
optimal, or in any sense canonical. Our purpose is only to demonstrate
that it is possible to define a finite notion of objective probability in physics
on the basis of considerations from physical computational complexity.
Our first model is constructed on the space of all possible physical
states of a given physical system with a given number of degrees of free-
dom n in a given moment in time t, confined to a given energy shell E.
Each such state, given assumption (A), is a result of a certain dynami-
cal evolution, which, in turn, is generated by a certain Hamiltonian. If
we assume further that all dynamical evolutions start from a common,
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“mother” state, say, the initial state of the universe, we can then assign
(using assumptions (B)–(E)) a non–uniform probability distribution on the
set of all possible states according to the time–complexity of the dynamical
evolution that realizes each state.7 As we shall see below, for a large num-
ber of degrees of freedom, this assignment has interesting consequences.
Our second model is constructed on the space of all possible dynamical
evolutions. Here, again, to precisely define the notion of objective phys-
ical probability we require the above triplet, i.e., the number of degrees
of freedom n, time t, and energy E. Given such a triplet, we construct a
probability space out of a functional that relates the power (E/t) of a com-
putation – seen as a dynamical evolution from one state to another – with
the relative size of the set of the possible dynamical evolutions that are
compatible with it. Our probability function is thus a distance measure
on the above functional, that quantifies how hard it is to realize a state, or
how far a given system is from that state, in terms of the physical resources
available to it, relative to the required resources.
3 Warming Up: Not All States Are Born Equal
The standard story about typicality (in classical SM, or in Bohmian me-
chanics in the context of QM) requires the notion of equiprobability, or
a uniform measure, relative to which a set is declared typical. The foun-
dations of SM are saturated with failed attempts to justify this choice of
measure,8 the most famous of which is Boltzmann’s ergodic hypothesis.9
7The move from the space of states to the space of dynamical evolutions is licit given
our assumptions (A) and (B) above: in any given moment in time, and for each physi-
cal state, there can be one and only one time–complexity class of dynamical evolutions
that “realizes” it from the common “mother” state. This means that while many time–
complexity classes of dynamical evolutions can realize the same state, no two evolutions
that belong to different time–complexity classes can do so at the same moment if they start
at the same common “mother” state.
8See, e.g., (Sklar 1993, pp. 156–195) for a summary.
9That the ergodic hypothesis falls short of justifying the assumption of equiprobability
follows from three facts: (1) many thermodynamic systems are not ergodic, (2) ergodicity
holds only at infinite time scales, and (3) such a justification is plainly circular, as it is valid
only for a set of “normal” states whose measure 1 is fixed, again, relative to the choice
of measure we are trying to justify from the outset. The last two facts are, essentially,
equivalent to the recent criticism against typicality.
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Our first stab at the notion of physical probability based on computational
complexity suggests how to deflate this problem.
At the crux of the matter lie the primitive notions of number and count-
ing. The choice of the Lebesgue measure is deemed “natural” when one
extends the standard notion of counting from the finite case to the infinite
one (Pitowsky, 2011). But why treat each state as equal (in number) to an-
other even in the finite case? Agreed, there are physical situations involv-
ing symmetries, such as the case of a fair die, that warrant such a treatment
(Strevens, 1998), but in general there is no a priori reason to count this way.
Consequently, in what follows we shall treat physical states in an utterly
politically incorrect manner, assigning states with non–equal weights in-
verse proportionally to the degree of time–complexity of the dynamical
evolution they are associated with. As it turns out, few empirical facts al-
low us to get as close to equiprobability as one can get in a finite setting,
without relying on any a priori notion of equiprobability or uniform proba-
bility distribution from the outset.
Our probability triplet thus consists of the following elements:
• Ω is the state space of all physical states of a system with n degrees of
freedom on a given energy shell in a given moment in time, obeying
the current laws of physics, i.e., realized by a certain physical process
whose time–complexity is either polynomial or exponential (“easy”
or “hard”). Note that Ω is a bounded and discrete set of polynomial
functions ∈ O(nc) and exponential functions ∈ O(cn).
• F is the σ–algebra of Ω, i.e., a non–empty class of subsets of Ω, con-
taining Ω itself, the empty set, and closed under the formation of
complements, finite unions, and finite intersections (i.e., F is a dis-
crete, bounded subset of the power set of Ω). The elements of F are
possible physical states, realized by physical processes with a com-
bined time–complexity, either exponential or polynomial.
• P is the probability measure that maps members of F onto [0, 1],
where P (∅) = 0, P (F ) = 1, such that P is additive.
We now proceed to the assignment of measures on sets of states. Let’s
denote with Exp and Poly a partition of F into two subsets with some prior
measures µe and µp = 1− µe.
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Next, for every function f ∈ (Poly ∪ Exp) we define the weight ξ of f at
an arbitrary (natural) point n as:10
ξf(n) = µe − arctan f
′(n)
Π/2
µe (1)
when f(n) ∈ Exp, and
ξf(n) = (1− µe) + [(1− µe)− arctan f
′(n)
Π/2
(1− µe)] (2)
when f(n) ∈ Poly.
For every function f ∈ (Poly ∪ Exp) we define the probability of f in an
arbitrary (natural) point n as
P (f(n)) = αξf(n). (3)
where α is a normalization parameter given by:
α =
1∑
i ξfi(n)
. (4)
It is easy to show that P (f(n)) ∈ [0, 1], that P (∅) = 0, and that by construc-
tion, the total probability is equal to 1. Furthermore, if we take into account
the complexity degree of each element of the bounded set (Poly∪Exp), we
can obtain a partition of (Poly∪ Exp) where every element of the partition
(indicate by I1, ..., In) corresponds to a different degree of complexity. We
now define P (I1) =
∑
fi∈I1 P (fi). It follows that:
∀i, j, P (Ii ∪ Ij) =
∑
fi∈Ii
P (fi) +
∑
fj∈Ij
P (fj). (5)
Thus P satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms, and as such it is an admissible
probability function.
Note that ξ is inverse proportional to the first derivative of the time–
complexity function of the dynamical evolution that realizes the state.
Consequently, for a large input size (i.e., a large number of degrees of free-
dom), the following results hold (see appendix A for details):
10Metaphorically, dynamical evolutions in Exp “lose weight” in direct proportion to
their degree of time–complexity. This total lost weight is now (non–uniformly) dis-
tributed on Poly in such a way that the dynamical evolutions in Poly gain relative
weights inverse proportionally to their degree of time–complexity.
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I. The set of states whose time–complexity is exponential gets assigned
a measure close to zero, while the set of states whose time–complexity
is polynomial gets assigned a measure close to one.
II. The polynomial states are (almost) uniformly distributed, i.e., their
distribution is (almost) a resolution of the identity.
We would like to clarify the following two points:
• Since the σ–algebra F is a bounded and discrete, α is always finite
(albeit very small for a large n). For this reason, in a finite model such
as ours, the assignment of actual measure 0 (or 1 for that matter),
as well as the assignment of equiprobability (as a resolution of the
identity on Poly) are fictions, as the set Exp remains with a finite
(albeit very small) measure, and the partition on the set Poly is never
strictly uniform. For a macroscopic system, however, ‘very small’ is
an understatement, and the above partition is very close to uniform.
When the state at hand is of the universe as a whole (where n ≈ 1080),
the understatement is literally a cosmic one, and equiprobability of
all polynomial time–complexity functions is a practical certainty.
• The normalization factor, α, is inverse proportional to the number of
possible time–complexity functions, and yet for combinatorial rea-
sons, this number, i , is directly related to n , the number of degrees
of freedom, hence, in effect, α is inverse proportional to n . One can
object here that we implicitly “sneak in” an assumption about equal
weights by treating each degree of freedom on equal footing.11 In re-
sponse, we stress that the this result rests not on an a priori notion of
counting, but rather on our assumption (E) above and on the empir-
ical fact that a concatenation of nearest–neighbor interactions is not
physically equivalent to one nonlocal interaction.12 In other words,
it is because of this (contingent) nature of physical interactions (and
the resources they require) that results (I) and (II) above hold.
11Recall that each time–complexity function represents a specific interaction Hamilto-
nian that generates it. For the normalization factor to be inverse proportional to the size
of the system, i.e., α ∝ n−1, we must assume that a two–body system possesses less pos-
sible interactions (hence less possible dynamical evolutions) than a many–body system.
This assumption, we argue, follows from the the locality condition.
12For an analysis of the complexity costs involved in simulating a nonlocal operator
with local ones see, e.g., (Vidal & Cirac, 2002).
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Are these results sufficient to support the common lore, according to
which “most” states are thermodynamic normal, i.e., typical, hence more
likely to be observed? The answer is clearly negative, but the reasons for
the insufficiency are quite subtle.
First, note that we have deliberately distributed weights on different
time–complexity functions in such a way that favors members of Poly
and disfavors members of Exp (see equations (1) & (2) above), but noth-
ing justifies such a distribution – we could just as well have constructed a
symmetric model in which Exp turned out to be assigned a measure close
to 1 and Poly a measure close to 0. This is exactly the problem typicality
arguments face (Hemmo & Shenker 2011a), and in this respect, our model
fares no better. What are model does show, however, is that for a large di-
mension, and given several plausible assumptions such as ours, equiprob-
ability (or some distribution close to it) holds among members of one of the
two sets. It is still a contingent matter of fact which set “wins over”, and in
this sense, experience remains the only source for justifying the choice of
measure.
In order to highlight another interesting feature of our model, let’s as-
sume that (I) and (II) above hold. One could still argue that in order to
support the common lore, it is necessary to demonstrate that the time–
complexity of the dynamical evolutions associated with those normal states
is polynomial. According to our model this would endow such states
with high probability. The problem is that the common lore also asso-
ciates thermodynamically normal behavior with non–integrable systems,
yet our probability model is discrete. As such, it harbors only integrable,
or periodic dynamical systems. One could still observe chaotic behavior
in this context,13 but this would require redefining notions such as “sen-
sitivity to initial conditions” or “dynamical instability” to fit the discrete
background, and would also require a careful analysis of time scales.14
But even such a demonstration would still fall short of supporting the
common lore. The standard notion of probability concerns a sequence of
13There is no compelling reason to associate chaos only with the cardinality of the reals.
See (Winnie, 1992) on the idea of “computable chaos”.
14At this point, and for the record, let us acknowledge the discrepancy between our
discrete model and the continuous nature of the time evolutions. The former is used in
computer science; the latter in physics. Both are consistent, and the question whether the
former approximates the latter or vice versa, i.e., which is more fundamental, seems to
us, at least at the current stage of physics, purely metaphysical.
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events, and in particular, a random choice of such sequences. We could, of
course, translate this notion to fit our new definition by exchanging events
with physical states, yet nothing constrains us to treat the above proba-
bility space of all possible states as isomorphic to the probability space that
contains our actual observations. In particular, even if on phase space ther-
modynamic normal states were members of a set of measure 1 and ther-
modynamic abnormal states were members of a set of measure 0, the mea-
sure imposed on the space of our actual observations could be different: we
could, for example, chose between thermodynamic normal or abnormal
states by tossing a fair coin, thus endowing them with equiprobability!
In fact, we know from experience that thermodynamic abnormal states
can be realized in the lab. The most famous examples for these are the spin
echo experiment (Hahn, 1950) and the Fermi–Pasta–Ulam (1955) discovery
of a violation of the equipartition theorem. If we call such ‘anomalies’
“rare”, we must explain how is it that we can repeat such “rare” events
ever so often.
In what follows we shall demonstrate how our new view on physical
probability can meet these challenges.
4 One Step at a Time
For an empiricist, the problem of justification of the choice of measure is
just a pseudo–problem, experience being the only source of justification
required. Our first model, however, may serve as a consistency proof,
demonstrating how equiprobability may arise from certain contingent as-
sumptions about (local) physical interactions and complexity consider-
ations. It thus motivates us to propose a new interpretation of objec-
tive probability based on computational time–complexity. We empha-
size again that all we offer here is a new meaning for the term “proba-
bility”. Quantitatively, at this stage we can only propose the conjecture
that, if worked out to its finest details, our proposal will converge to the
actual (and so far well–confirmed) probabilities that are currently being
employed in statistical physics. We shall say more on this in section (5).
We thus suggest to interpret objective probability as a physical magni-
tude that quantifies how hard it is to realize a physical state, given a triplet
of physical resources (energy, time, space). Equivalently, this magnitude
quantifies how ‘far’ a given physical system is from a certain state in terms
13
of the physical resources available to it, relative to those required for that
state’s realization.
• Take any physical system with dimension n in a given energy stateE
and in a given moment in time t, and let Ω be the bounded and dis-
crete set of possible dynamical evolutions obeying the current laws
of physics, whose time–complexity is either polynomial or exponen-
tial (“easy” or “hard”), that may govern the system’s behavior. The
set Ω contains all possible dynamical evolutions that can realize a sin-
gle actual state.
• Given a certain couple (n, E
t
), where n is the dimension of the state,
E is the total possible energy, and t is the total possible time, we
consider the set
Sn¯ = {gn ∈ Ω|O(gn¯) ≤ #(E
t
)} (6)
where gn¯ is a dynamical evolution that for a given n “consumes” at
most the resources E in time t (we denote the power allowed for the
computation as Pw = E/t).15
• F is the σ–algebra of S, i.e., a non–empty class of subsets of S, con-
taining S itself, the empty set, and closed under the formation of
complements, finite unions, and finite intersections. The elements
of F are dynamical evolutions with a combined time–complexity, ei-
ther exponential or polynomial. F is thus a subset of the power set
of S, and is bounded and discrete.
Our probability measure P is given by the mapping:
∀A ∈ F : P{nA,(Et )A}(A) =
|A|
|S| (7)
15By “consumes” we mean the following. Take an arbitrary computation. Each compu-
tational step “costs” the same amount of time; but if, as in our case, the total time allowed
for the computation is fixed, the difference in time–complexity is cashed out in terms of
the difference in the frequency of the computation, i.e., the time–difference between any
two computational steps. Thus, for a given n and for a given t, the higher the degree
of time–complexity of the function, the higher the frequency of the computation. Since
higher frequency means higher power, by setting a bound on Pw, one immediately sets
a bound on the number of computational steps allowed for the computation (#), and
subsequently, a bound on the number of time–complexity functions that can realize the
computation.
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Figure 1: Probability from time–complexity
Where
(
E
t
)
A
is the available power.16 To calculate this magnitude we
embed it in a continuous function of the general concave form # = (nαPw)1/β ,
where α and β are free parameters.
By construction P (A) ∈ [0, 1], P (∅) = 0, P (S) = 1, and P is additive:
∀A,B ∈ F such that A ∩ B = ∅ , P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B). In order
to satisfy further constraints imposed by the axioms of probability theory,
the curvature of (nαPw)1/β – controlled by α and β – must satisfy further
conditions. We spell out these in the appendix.
From a computational complexity perspective, the meaning of P is
straightforward:
• P = 0 means that the desired state is non–Turing–computable, i.e.,
16Mathematically speaking, the mapping between # and Pw is discontinuous. We can
still define P with an integral, however, using an approximation, by embedding this
mapping into the continuous function f , This embedding has one advantage, namely, it
allows us to constrain our model: the curve # = fn¯(Pw) relates time–complexity functions
(indirectly via the number of steps they require for the computation) with the power of
the computation, and is of the general concave form (nαPw)1β – since all time–complexity
functions are monotonic, have a common origin, and are otherwise non–intersecting,
∀Pwi, Pwj , x such that Pwi < Pwj , x ∈ N : fn¯(Pwi+x) − fn¯(Pwi) > fn¯(Pwj+x) − fn¯(Pwj)
– where α and β are free parameters, constrained by the theorems of probability theory
(e.g., independence, conditional probability). See appendix B–E.
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its realization requires a non–algorithmic process, such as a measure-
ment with infinite precision.
• P = 1 means that we are ‘at’ the desired state hence its realization
requires constant resources. In complexity theory, such a process
would be assigned complexity O(1).
• 0 < P < 1 means that the given system is “P–distant’ from the de-
sired final state. In other words, P denotes the transition probability
between the intermediate states, captured by the size of the set of
possible time–complexity functions that are compatible with the re-
sources required for that transition.
5 Ignorance of what?
Consistent with our goal to turn epistemic probability in statistical physics
into an objective one, the notion of physical probability here proposed has
nothing to do with one’s credence or degrees of belief. It measures, as we
have seen, three equivalent physical properties that each pair of physical
states objectively possess:
• The difficulty (in terms of physical resources) to realize the transition
from one state to another. The more probable a state, the easier it is
to reach it from a given state with a given amount of resources.
• The distance (in terms of physical resources) between one state and
another. The more probable a state, the shorter is its distance (in
terms of physical resources) from the initial state.
• The relative size of the set of time–complexity functions that are com-
patible with the above two properties. The more probable a state, the
larger is this size.
To see how this notion of probability can turn subjective “ignorance” in
statistical physics into an objective feature of the world, we propose the
following intuition.
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5.1 Classical mechanics
Start with classical mechanics. Here the common lore traces probabilis-
tic statements to dynamical sensitivity of initial conditions. Omniscient
beings such as Laplace’s demon, or so the story goes, could predict with
certainty any possible outcome of a dynamical evolution.17 Short of this a
power, finite creatures such as ourselves are constrained to introduce error
into their predictions. What we suggest here is that this error has physical
meaning, captured by our notion of probability.18
Suppose we would like to predict a certain outcome of an experiment
in the lab, described by classical mechanics. Unless we already possess
the initial state of our experiment, we need to create, or prepare it. The
preparation of the initial state, starting from a specific state we do pos-
sess, requires physical resources. If these are limited, then our probability
Pcomplexity quantifies how far we are from the ideal initial state, or equiv-
alently, what is the error, , in our preparation, where Pcomplexity = 1 − .
Thus if resources are insufficient, we start an experiment not in the ideal
initial state, but in another, actual state, –distant from the ideal state, and
so, even with deterministic dynamics, we have an error in the final state,
which turns out to be different than the one we’d expected. This actual er-
ror in the preparation of the state doesn’t mean that the system possesses
no definite state. On the contrary, the system is always in a definite state; it
is just in a state distant from the desired state with a certain error , which
in turn is (inverse) proportional to the resources we employ in the prepa-
ration. As our second model shows, this distance can be regarded as a
probability measure.
When we move from mechanics to statistical mechanics, we introduce
a distinction between micro–states and macro–states. The evolution of the
former on phase space is constrained by Liouville’s theorem, that tell us
that a region of phase space (call it ”a blob”), occupied by a set of micro–
states all compatible with a certain macro–state, may change is shape but
not its volume. The ”evolution” of the latter is dictated by the kind of mea-
surements we make, i.e., by the different partitions we impose on phase
17Given our assumption (A), such evolutions are restricted to Turing–computable ones.
See (Pitowsky, 1996).
18On another interesting relation between error and complexity costs see (Traub & Wer-
schultz, 1999).
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space. These two evolutions are independent,19 and they allow us to de-
fine the transition probability of a physical system from one macro–state
to another as the partial overlap between the blobs and the macro–states:
P ([M1]t1|[M0]t0) = µ (Bt1 ∩ [M1]) (8)
This means that the probability that a system that starts at a macro–state
[M0] at time t0 (when the size of the dynamical blob B completely satu-
rates the volume [M0]) will end in a macro–state [M1] at time t2, is given by
the partial overlap (the relative size) µ of the dynamical blob B at t2 with
the macro–state [M1]. Note that there is nothing subjective in this kind
of transition probability. ”Ignorance” here simply means lack of resolu-
tion power, i.e., lack of precision or lack of control, which is expressed by
the relation between dynamical blobs and macro–states, both of which are
objective features of the physical world.
One can describe the evolution of a dynamical system either by follow-
ing its dynamical blob, or, equivalently by following the macro–states to
which the exact state belongs. In the first description probability signifies
lack of precision; in the second, lack of control. We have already shown
that our probability measure describes the amount of missing resources
for an exact description in the first case. In the second case, we can define
our probability as an objective physical magnitude, a transition probabil-
ity between two macro–states M0 and M1, that signifies how ”far” is M1
from M0, where the ”distance” P (M0,M1) is defined in terms of the phys-
ical resources (energy, space, and time) that an observer who observes M0
has, relative to what she needs in order to observe M1.
In this sense, probability is an objective measure of the difficulty to pro-
duce the macro–state M1 from the macro–state M0 given the physical re-
sources (energy, space, and time) at one’s disposal. Moreover, this measure
is identical, conceptually and formally, to the one used in the foundations
of statistical mechanics (8), as one can interpret any probability less than 1
as signifying the lack of physical resources that can allow one to partition
phase space into a macro–state more accurately in such a way that it will
include all of the dynamical blob.
Here is how: when the system starts in a given initial macro–state M0,
its dynamical blob completely saturates the volume [M0]; this is what we
19see Hemmo and Shenker (2012) for the trouble one gets into when one ignores this
independence.
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mean when we say that we know the system to be in state M0.20 We now
make a measurement, hoping to find the system in M1 after it. In other
words, we now carve up phase space into a different macro–state. If we
have enough resources available, we can accurately carve the macro–state
M1, so that the dynamical blob will, again, saturate its volume [M1]; if
we do not have enough resources, only part of the dynamical blob would
overlap with [M1]. The empirical conjecture we make, over and above the
requirement for conformity with the observed relative frequencies, is that
this relative volume of the dynamical blob in [M1] should be a function
of the physical resources we have relative to what we need in order to
observe M1 with certainty. This conjecture is in principle testable in many
scenarios within control theory, where one is trying to steer a physical
process to a desirable outcome.
5.2 Quantum mechanics
In quantum mechanics the situation is no different. Here the (determinis-
tic!) evolution of a physical system is given by the propagator Uβ = e−iHt
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system. Now, our attempt to estimate
this propagator introduces an error, and results in an approximate propa-
gator, Uα, where the error is given by the distance between the two propa-
gators:
d(Uβ, Uα) = ||Uβ − Uα||op = sup
|||ψ〉||=1
||(Uβ − Uα) |ψ〉||C2 . (9)
where Uα and Uβ are two different rotation operators along, say, the y axis,
and 0 < α < β < pi
2
. Here, again, the error  , and therefore our notion of
probability, Pcomplexity = 1 −  , quantify the distance (in terms of energy
and time) between two physical states – in this case, the distance, relative
to a common initial energy state |ψ0〉, between the “ideal” energy state
|ψ2〉 and the energy state |ψ1〉 we can prepare with the physical resources
that are available to us (see figure 2). One can prove that d(Uβ, Uα) =
20The opposite case, when we are uncertain of the initial state, can also be accommo-
dated in this framework, by identifying the the error  with lack of physical resources,
and by defining the probability P = 1− . In this case P measures the distance between
the state we think the system is in and the actual state it is in, i.e., the macro–state that the
dynamical blob does saturate. In other words, in this case M0 and M1 switch places.
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Figure 2: Quantum probabilities as distance measures
2(1− cos(β−α)). By denoting the error  = d(Uβ, Uα)/2, it follows that our
probability is related to the quantum Born rule:
Pcomplexity = 〈ψ2|ψ1〉 =
√
PQM. (10)
What is the physical meaning of “preparation” and “estimation”? Phys-
ically, these are measurements – in our case, measurements of energy.
But a proper energy measurement probes the time evolution, and there-
fore cannot be done with arbitrary time, unless one knows in advance the
Hamiltonian of the system at hand.21 Rather, the time required to perform
the measurement and the precision of the measurement are constrained by
the time–energy uncertainty relation. For this reason, unless we know in
advance the Hamiltonian that governs the dynamics of a physical system,
we can never predict its future behavior with probability 1. To know the
Hamiltonian, however, we need to measure the system’s energy, i.e., to
21Aharonov & Bohm (1961), for example, proposed a clever way to bypass the time–
energy uncertainty principle by measuring a spin–half particle in a magnetic field. Later
it was shown that this ability to bypass the time–energy uncertainty relation rests on the
prior knowledge of the Hamiltonian: if one knows the Hamiltonian, one need not spend
any time (hence computational – qua physical – resources) in estimating it, but whenever
the Hamiltonian of a system is unknown, determining it to precision ∆H requires a time
∆t given by ∆t∆H ≥ 1. See (Aharonov, Massar, & Popescu, 2002).
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prepare it in a certain energy state, and this preparation will not be error–
free, whence objective uncertainty.
In this sense our proposal can serve as a basis for a new interpreta-
tion of QM. Recall that on the subjective view of QM, the quantum state is
treated as a state of knowledge, and quantum probabilities (calculated by
the Born rule) are interpreted as “gambling bets” of agents on results of ex-
periments, a-la Ramsey–De Finetti (Fuchs, 2010). In contrast, in Bohmian
mechanics, the alternative epistemic approach in the foundations of QM,
the probabilities are for particles to have certain positions; they signify our
ignorance thereof. The above insistence on “agents”, or “observers” – con-
sidered by proponents of the subjective view as their claim to fame (Fuchs
& Peres, 2000) – is rejected by Bohmians as ontologically vague; the whole
point behind arguments about typicality is to free the discussion from such
notions. Our new idea about probability simply avoids this debate alto-
gether by supplying a possible third way: what quantum probabilities are
probabilities for is neither the positions of particles, nor the gambling bets
of learned observers. Rather, quantum probabilities simply quantify how
hard it is to realize a physical state; they measure the ‘distance’ between
the current state of a physical system and any other state thereof, given
the resources (energy/time) that are available to that system at that mo-
ment. This alternative allows us to interpret quantum probabilities as ob-
jective deterministic chances (and in so doing to turn QM once again into
a physical theory about the world), without having to support typicality
and nonlocal hidden variables.
These two examples demonstrate the promise of our approach. In both
cases – classical and quantum mechanics – the dynamics is deterministic,
and yet probability arises from measurement errors which in turn result
from lack of sufficient physical resources. In the classical framework re-
sources are in principle unbounded (potentially infinite) but finite in prac-
tice; in the quantum case they are finite in principle.
5.3 Quantum vs. Classical probabilities
In the approach presented here, the origins of both quantum and classi-
cal probabilities is identical – they both stem from objective deterministic
chances which supervene on time–complexity classes and relative avail-
ability of physical resources. This is not surprising. The physical Church–
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Turing thesis collapses two separate distinctions, namely, (un)predictability
and (in)determinism, into one (Earman, 1986), treating both on a par as
epistemic. Some maintain (Pitowsky, 1996) that such an alleged subor-
dination of metaphysics to epistemology makes it is impossible to dis-
tinguish between quantum and classical probabilities, and stands in flat
contrast to the famous no–hidden–variables results, and the received wis-
dom about the difference between classical and quantum probabilities,
captured by the violations of Bell’s inequalities.
That metaphysics is ignored is a natural consequence of our empiricist
framework. But what the critics fail to notice is that an identity in kind need
not entail an identity in measure, and that one can still distinguish between
quantum and classical probability measures despite their common origin;
metaphysics, we suggest, has nothing to do with this.22
In the classical case the error (and hence the probability) can decrease
(increase) arbitrarily with the increase of these resources. In contrast, in
the quantum case the uncertainty principle imposes an actual cut–off on
such a potential infinity of resources, which makes it impossible in princi-
ple to eliminate the error. Thus the inability of Laplace’s demon to predict
quantum phenomena results not from some vague metaphysical notion
of quantum indefiniteness (“no–hidden–variables”), but from the actual
finite bounds on physical resources in our world. Consequently, while
the notion of probability here proposed is predicated in both the quantum
and the classical cases on error, or lack of sufficient physical resources,
this shared origin results not from subordinating ontology to epistemol-
ogy. Rather, it is the product of a physical cut–off which excludes an un-
bounded increase of physical resources in the preparation of any given
state.
That quantum and classical probabilities may be traced to the same
origins stems from assumptions the actual bound imposed on physical re-
sources in the world, and the discreteness of energy. In such a finite and
discrete world, classical unpredictability that results from “lack of knowl-
edge” is on a par with quantum uncertainty; both arise from measurement
errors as a consequence of insufficient physical resources. But the new
view also changes the rules of the game, as it simply rejects vague meta-
physical notions such as “quantum indefiniteness” as possible criteria for
22To be fair to Pitowsky (1996), his analysis concerned the notion of computability,
while ours concerns the notion of complexity, or efficiency.
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distinguishing quantum and classical probabilities. On the other hand,
that a physical system is always in a definite state need not entail hidden
variables, as on the view proposed here it is simply not the case that the
system is in a definite but unknown state. Rather, the actual definite state
the system possesses is just different from the ideal state we would like it
to be in. It is this discrepancy between the actual and the ideal is what
generates probabilities in both the quantum and the classical cases.
Finally, despite the lack of metaphysical difference, we can still distin-
guish between quantum and classical probabilities. Instead of “hidden
variables” vs. “indefiniteness” we suggest a difference in measure, which
in our case is complexity–induced. Indeed, it is a working hypothesis
within quantum information scientists that any classical computation that
would be harnessed for the simulation of quantum phenomena would do
so inefficiently.23 Our approach can easily accommodate such a putative
difference: the notion of probability we propose here is defined as the rel-
ative size of the set of time–complexity classes that can realize a physical
state. That quantum and classical probabilities share the same origins need
not entail that for every physical state the above relative size is also identi-
cal. Quantum dynamical evolutions may “consume” (in the sense devel-
oped in fn. (15)) less resources than classical ones, and so the probability of
some physical states may as well be different when realized by quantum
or by classical dynamics. We suggest to view the violations of Bell’s in-
equality as designating exactly this difference; a difference in complexity,
not in metaphysics (Buhrman et al., 1998). Note, moreover, that such a cri-
terion is completely in accord with our current empirical knowledge, and
yet, contrary to its metaphysical counterpart, it leaves open the question
of the universality of quantum theory.24
6 Conclusion: Probability as Distance Measure
Our distance measure satisfies Kolmogorov axioms (see appendix B–E),
hence, at least mathematically, it is worthy of the name “probability”. It
23This conjecture was first voiced by Feynman (1982). Computer scientists have for-
malized it as BPP ⊆ BQP (Aaronson, 2009).
24Our probability measure depends on the dimension of the system, which appears
to be a key factor in the open problem of scaling–up quantum information processing
devices.
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also explains away ignorance by tying error (in the preparation of the ini-
tial state, or propagator) to probability (of the desired state, or propagator),
and by supervening this probability on time–complexity and physical re-
sources. In the classical context, it appears to be a natural physical inter-
pretation of the epistemic probabilities that arise in statistical mechanics
(see eq. (8)). Preliminary results (see eqs. (9) and (10)) suggest that such a
distance measure is also a natural interpretation of quantum probabilities.
We emphasize again that we are only proposing a new interpretation to
the meaning of probability: instead of interpreting probability as a mea-
sure of ignorance (which is the standard way in a deterministic dynamical
context), we propose an interpretation in terms of the distance (in terms of
the relative physical resources) between an actual state and an ideal one.
In this sense our proposal is only qualitative. Quantitatively, we conjecture
that one can reproduce the observed relative frequencies and standard re-
sults in statistical physics from such a notion which supervenes on time–
complexity classes; our two models should be thus seen as plausibility
arguments in support of this conjecture.25 Moreover, we do not pretend
in any way to go beyond objective probabilities in statistical physics in
our interpretation. Whatever problems exist in connecting these with the
ordinary notion of probability, namely the connection to relative frequen-
cies, or to betting behavior, also exist in our interpretation, and we do not
purport to solve them here.
Concluding, we have argued that he amount of physical resources that
separate two physical states is an objective feature of the world, and that
computational complexity theory allows us to map this feature onto [0, 1].
This mapping, as we have shown, has all the characteristics of a discrete
probability function, that can be interpreted as a measure of precision and
control.
25Albert (2000, ch. 5) offers a similar conjecture when he proposes that the probabilities
of SM supervene on transition probabilities of a more fundamental collapse dynamics.
Our view is deterministic, hence excludes collapse, but we too suggest that probabilities
in statistical physics are dynamical transition probabilities. In our story, however, they
supervene on time–complexity and relative physical resources.
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Appendix
6.1 Measures
Let us consider an arbitrary exponential function cn and its associated
probability:
P (cn) = [µ− arctan(c
nlnc)
Π/2
µ]α. (11)
where
α =
1∑
fi|fi∈Poly ξfi +
∑
fi|fi∈Exp ξfi
. (12)
It is straightforward to show that for a large dimension n
∀c : P (cn) ≈ (µ− µ)α = 0. (13)
In contrast, since for a large dimension arctan(cn
c−1
1 )
Π/2
≈ 1, the unnormalized
measure ξp on Poly doesn’t change and is 1− µe, but when we normalize,
we get a resolution of the identity
P (f(n)) = αξp =
1− µe
i(1− µe) = i
−1 (14)
where i is the number of polynomial functions in Poly.
6.2 Joint Probability
To calculate joint probability in case of independence one needs to realize
a new probability space S3 from two given probability spaces S1 and S2,
where the new couple {n3,
(
E
t
)
3
} is given by the respective sums, i.e., n3 =
n1 + n2 and
(
E
t
)
3
=
(
E
t
)
1
+
(
E
t
)
2
.
• S3 is defined accordingly as:
Sn¯3 = {g ∈ Ω|O(gn¯3) ≤ #(
(
E
t
)
3
)} (15)
• The probability measure P is given, again, by the mapping
∀A ∈ F : P{nA,(Et )A}(A) =
|A|
|S3| (16)
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Figure 3: Independence
• One can calculate the joint probability for a combined stateC = A∩B
by taking into considerations the way the physical resources are dis-
tributed between the two components of the combined system. Since
we are constructing a new probability space, additional constraints
must be satisfied to maintain the appropriate relations between this
new space and the earlier, atomic ones.
1. We define equivalent processes to have the same power and the same
dimension:
• (E
t
)
1
=
(
E
t
)
2
.
• nA∩B = n1 + n2 = 2n1 = 2n2.
So in this case, since all interactions are local, the total available
power is
(
E
t
)
A∩B =
(
E
t
)
1
n1
n1+n2
+
(
E
t
)
2
n2
n1+n2
.
2. For such processes, since n increases and the power remains the
same, it follows that P3(A ∩ B) < P1(A); P3(A ∩ B) < P2(B) (where
the P s are calculated for each case separately).
3. If B depends on A, P3(A ∩ B) > P1(A)P2(B). This case is accom-
modated in our model by noticing that the computation time for B
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Figure 4: Conditional probability
already includes the computation time for A, hence the total com-
putation time is shorter than the computation time in the case of in-
dependence, hence the power of the computation is higher than the
case of independence, as required.
6.3 Conditional Probability
Conditional probability P (A|B) is calculated by rescaling S1 to fit S2 (in
terms of n), and by calculating the ratio P (A ∩B)/P (B)
6.4 Constraints
These requirements can be used to constrain f : when we blow up the
dimension by a factor of γ and keep the power fixed, the derivative goes
down by a factor of γα; when we blow up the dimension and keep the
derivative fixed, the power goes up by a factor of γ
α
β−1 . For non–equivalent
processes, where
(
E
t
)
A
= δ
(
E
t
)
B
(0 < δ < 1), we can show that(
E
t
)
A
<
(
E
t
)
A∩B
<
(
E
t
)
B
. (17)
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If we require further that the power of A grows less than the “blow–up
effect” (that is, that as n increases the Power axis increases less rapidly
than the number–of–steps axis)(
E
t
)
A∩B(
E
t
)
A
<
(
1 +
1− δ
δγ
)
. (18)
we get a constraint on α and β:
α
β − 1 > logγ
(
1 +
1− δ
δγ
)
. (19)
6.5 Proofs
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, instead of taking
the function # = (nαPw)1/β , we concentrate on the inverse function Pw =
n−α#β , while recalling that for any continuous, derivable, and monotonic
function g, (g−1)′(x) = 1
g′(y) .
Let
(
E
t
)
A
= PwA,
(
E
t
)
B
= PwB, and nA = ∆nB, where ∆ ∈ R,∆ > 1 , and
let 0 < PwA
PwB
= δ ≤ 1. We prove that: PwA ≤ PwA∩B ≤ PwB (equality holds
only when PwA = PwB) :
PwA∩B = PwA
∆nB
(∆ + 1)nB
+ PwB
nB
(∆ + 1)nB
= (20)
= δPwB
∆
∆ + 1
+ PwB
1
(∆ + 1)nB
= (21)
=
∆δ + 1
∆ + 1
PwB =
∆δ + 1
∆δ + δ
PwA. (22)
But,
∆δ + 1
∆ + 1
≤ 1 ; ∆δ + 1
∆δ + δ
≥ 1. (23)
If we blow up n by a real factor γ > 1 and we keep the power fixed:
fn¯(#) =
1
n¯α
#β ; f ′n¯(#) =
β
n¯α
#β−1. (24)
Analogously:
f ′γn¯(#) =
β
(γn¯)α
#β−1. (25)
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So,
f ′γn¯(#)
f ′¯n(#)
= γ−α. (26)
If we blow up n by a real factor γ > 1 and we keep the derivative fixed:
Pw = fn¯(#) =
1
n¯α
#β. (27)
The derivative for a number of steps #¯ will be
f ′n¯(#¯) =
β
n¯α
#¯β−1. (28)
Analogously, for the new (blown–up) power P˜w
P˜w = f ′γn¯(#˜) =
β
(γn¯)α
#˜β−1. (29)
In order to maintain the same derivative, we find the value of #˜ such that:
β
(γn¯)α
#˜β−1 =
β
n¯α
#¯β−1. (30)
We obtain: #˜ = γ
α
β−1 #¯ So,
fγn¯(γ
α
β−1 #¯) =
1
(γn¯)α
(γ
α
β−1 #¯)β = γ
αβ
β−1fn¯(#¯). (31)
Hence, P˜w
Pw
= γ
α
β−1 . Finally, we know that PwA∩B
PwA
= ∆δ+1
(∆+1)δ
and that ˜PwA
PwA
=
(∆ + 1)
α
β−1 . Let us recall that γ = ∆ + 1 and that 0 < δ ≤ 1. We have to
prove that there is some constraint on α and β such that PwA∩B
PwA
<
˜PwA
PwA
. From
aδ + 1
(∆ + 1)δ
< (∆ + 1)
α
β−1 . (32)
we obtain that
α
β − 1 > logγ
∆δ + 1
∆δ + δ
. (33)
But
∆δ + 1
∆δ + δ
=
∆δ + 1 + δ − δ
δ(∆ + 1)
=
δ(∆ + 1) + 1− δ
δ(∆ + 1)
= 1 +
1− δ
δγ
. (34)
so our constraint is
α
β − 1 > logγ
(
1 +
1− δ
δγ
)
. (35)
29
References
[1] Aaronson, S. (2009). BQP and the polynomial hierarchy.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.4698.
[2] Aharonov, Y., and D. Bohm (1961). Time in the quantum theory and
the uncertainty relation for time and energy. Physical Review, 122(5),
1649–1658.
[3] Aharonov, Y., S. Massar, and S. Popescu (2002). Measuring energy,
estimating hamiltonians, and the time–energy uncertainty relation.
Physical Review A, 66, 5107.
[4] Albert, D. (2000). Time and Chance. Harvard: Harvard University
Press.
[5] Buhrman, H. Cleve, and R. Wigderson, A. (1998). Quantum vs. clas-
sical communication and computation. Proceedings of the 13th annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 63–68.
[6] Caves, C., C Fuchs, and R. Schack (2002). Quantum probabilities as
bayesian probabilities. Physical Review A, 65, 022305.
[7] Childs, A., J. Preskill, and J. Renes (2000). Quantum information and
precision measurement. Journal of Modern Optics, 47(213), 155–176.
[8] Earman, J., and J. Norton (1993). Forever is a day: supertasks in
Pitowsky and Malament–Hogarth spacetimes. Philosophy of Science,
60, 22–42.
[9] Feynman, R. (1982). Simulating physics with computers. International
Journal of Theoretical Physics, 21, 467–488.
[10] Fermi, E., J. Pasta, S. Ulam, and M. Tsingou (1955). Studies of nonlin-
ear problems I. Los Alamos preprint LA-1940.
[11] Frigg, R. (2007). Probability in Bolzmannian statistical mechanics. In
G. Ernst and A. H U¨ttemann (eds.) Time, Chance and Reduction, Philo-
sophical Aspects of Statistical Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
30
[12] Fuchs, C. (2010). QBism, the perimeter of Quantum Bayesianism.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1003.5209.
[13] Fuchs, C., and A. Peres (2000). Quantum theory needs no interpreta-
tion. Physics Today 53, 70–71.
[14] Geroch, R., and J. Hartle (1986). Computability and physical theories.
Foundations of Physics, 16(6), 533–550.
[15] Goldstein, S. , J. L. Lebowitz, R. Tumulka, and N. Zanghi
(2010). Long–time behavior of macroscopic quantum systems:
commentary accompanying the English translation of John
von Neumann’s 1929 article on the quantum ergodic theorem.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1003.2129v1.
[16] Hagar, A. (2003). A philosopher looks at quantum information theory.
Philosophy of Science, 70, 752–775.
[17] Hahn, E. (1950). Spin echoes. Physical Review, 80, 580–594.
[18] Hartmanis, J., and R.E. Stearns (1965). On the computational com-
plexity of algorithms. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society,
117, 285–306.
[19] Hemmo, M., and O. Shenker (2011a). Probability and typicality in
physics. In M. Hemmo and Y. Ben Menachem (eds.) Probability in
Physics, Essays in Memory of Itamar Pitowsky. The Frontiers Collection,
Berlin: Springer.
[20] ————————————- (2011b). A new problem in the frequen-
tist approach to probability. Forthcoming in Mind.
[21] ———————————— (2012). The Road to Maxwell’s Demon.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[22] Hogarth, M., Non–Turing computers and non–Turing computability.
In D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R. M. Burian (eds)., PSA 1994, Vol. 1. , pp.
126–138. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.
[23] Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical Papers (Vol. 2). Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
31
[24] Maudlin, T. (2007). What could be objective about probabilities? Stud-
ies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38, 275–291.
[25] Pitowsky, I. (1985). On the status of statistical inferences. Synthese
63(2), 233–247.
[26] ————– (1990). The physical Church thesis and physical computa-
tional complexity”, Iyyun 39, 87–99.
[27] ————– (1996). Laplace’s demon consults an oracle: the compu-
tational complexity of prediction. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics, 17, 161–180.
[28] ————— (2011). Typicality and the role of the Lebesgue measure
in statistical mechanics. In M. Hemmo and Y. Ben Menachem (eds.)
Probability in Physics, Essays in Memory of Itamar Pitowsky, The Fron-
tiers Collection, Berlin: Springer.
[29] Pitowsky, I., and O. Shagrir (2003). Physical hypercomputation and
the Church–Turing thesis”, Minds & Machines, 13, 87–101.
[30] Pour–el, M. and I. Richards (1989). Computability in Analysis and
Physics, Berlin: Springer.
[31] Sklar, L. (1993). Physics and Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
[32] Strevens, M. (1998). Inferring physical probabilities from symmetries.
Nous 32, 231–246.
[33] Traub, J., and A. Werschultz (1999). Complexity and Information. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
[34] Uffink, J. (2011). Subjective probability and statistical physics. In C.
Beisbart and S. Hartmann (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
[35] Vidal, G., and I. Cirac (2002). Optimal simulation of nonlocal Hamil-
tonians using local operations and classical communication. Physical
Review A, 66, 022315.
[36] Winnie, J. A. (1992). Computable chaos. Philosophy of Science, 59(2),
263–275.
32
